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On How Definitions of Habits Can 
Complicate Habit Research
Jan De Houwer*
Department of Experimental Clinical and Health Psychology, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
The core message of this paper is that many of the challenges of habit research can 
be traced back to the presence of causal elements within the definition of habits. For 
instance, the idea that habits are stimulus-driven implies that habitual behavior is not 
causally mediated by goal-representations. The presence of these causal elements in the 
definition of habits leads to difficulties in establishing empirically whether behavior is 
habitual. Some of these elements can also impoverish theoretical thinking about the 
mechanisms underlying habitual behavior. I argue that habit research would benefit from 
eliminating any reference to specific S-R association formation theories from the definition 
of habits. Which causal elements are retained in the definition of habits depends on the 
goals of researchers. However, regardless of the definition that is selected, it is good to 
be aware of the implications of the definition of habits for empirical and theoretical research 
on habits.
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When asked to explain their behavior, lay people often refer to habits. Likewise, when 
making resolutions for the future, they often express a wish to install new habits or to 
change old ones. The concept “habit” is popular not only with lay people but also engages 
academic psychologists (see Wood and Rünger, 2016, for a review). As noted by Gardner 
(2015), one important difference in the way habits are conceptualized by lay people versus 
academics is that the former focus on observable aspects of behavior (e.g., the frequency 
with which a behavior is emitted) whereas the latter focus on the (mental) causes of behavior 
(e.g., the fact that the behavior is triggered by cues in the environment without being 
directed at goals; see Wood and Neal, 2007, for a discussion of the interface between habits 
and goals).
Although the focus on explanation is an undeniable strength of the academic approach to 
habits, in this paper, I  draw attention the downsides of incorporating assumptions about causes 
into definitions of habits and habitual behavior. In the section “The Conceptual Level: Defining 
Habits and Habitual Behavior,” I  briefly consider some of the definitions of habits that have 
been put forward by lay people and academics. These definitions have in common that they 
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have implications for the criteria that are used to distinguish 
empirically between habitual and non-habitual behavior. In the 
section “The Empirical Level: Establishing the Presence of 
Habitual Behavior,” I discuss problems with empirically verifying 
the causal criteria put forward in the scientific literature on 
habits. The section “The Theoretical Level: Explaining Habitual 
Behavior” focuses on the constraints in theorizing that follow 
from definitions of habits that refer to S-R associations (i.e., 
links between stimulus and response representations via which 
activation can spread). Finally, I  discuss the possible merits 
of removing causal assumptions from the definition of habits. 
Many of the challenges that are addressed in this paper have 
been discussed before by others (e.g., Watson and de Wit, 
2018). The current paper aims to go beyond those past 
contributions by highlighting how these challenges relate to 
the causal nature of scientific definitions of habits. Based on 
this insight, new ways of tackling these challenges can 
be  considered.
THE CONCEPTUAL LEVEL: DEFINING 
HABITS AND HABITUAL BEHAVIOR
The first challenge for any area of research is to reach some 
level of clarity about and consensus on what is being studied 
(i.e., what constitutes the explanandum). To the extent that 
definitions of a research topic diverge, scientific progress is 
bound to be hampered by misunderstandings and false debates. 
Although the definition of a concept can change over time 
and general agreement about definitions is rare in psychological 
science, there is merit in trying to improve clarity at the 
conceptual level, if only by creating awareness of the various 
definitions that have been proposed and the way in which 
they are related (Machado and Silva, 2007). In this section, 
I  will first consider the different ways in which habits have 
been defined. This allows me to then highlight the causal 
nature of those definitions and the implications this has for 
habit research.
The recent paper of Gardner (2015) provides an excellent 
starting point for considering the range of definitions of habits 
that have been proposed. Lay definitions are mainly descriptive, 
referring to habits as behaviors that are emitted frequently or 
in a persistent, automatic manner. Scientific definitions of habits, 
on the other hand, contain explanatory elements. Some of 
these scientific definitions also refer to habits as (frequent, 
persistent, or automatic) behaviors but in addition those behaviors 
are said to have particular causes. These causes can refer to 
past experience, such as the idea that habits are the result of 
the repetition of behavior, and/or to underlying mental processes, 
such as the idea that habits result from the activation of S-R 
associations without the involvement of goals (i.e., representations 
of desired end states; see Gardner, 2015, for an overview). 
Many of these definitions imply that habitual behavior is 
stimulus-driven, that is, dependent on cues in the current 
context that trigger the behavior without considerations of the 
current outcomes of the behavior1. Other scientific definitions 
do not refer to habits as a behavior but as a mental cause 
underlying behavior. For instance, habits have been defined 
as behavioral impulses that are instigated by S-R associations 
or as the S-R associations themselves. Many definitions, however, 
refer to several of these components. To illustrate, Gardner 
et  al. (2011, p.  175) define habits as “behavioural patterns 
learned through context dependent repetition: repeated 
performance in unvarying settings reinforces context-behaviour 
associations such that, subsequently, encountering the context 
is sufficient to automatically cue the habitual response.” Wood 
and Neal (2009, p. 580) define habits as “A type of automaticity 
characterized by a rigid contextual cuing of behavior that does 
not depend on people’s goals and intentions. Habits develop 
as people respond repeatedly in a stable context and thereby 
form direct associations in memory between that response 
and cues in the performance context.”
Gardner (2015) already highlighted the fundamental difference 
between habits as a type of behavior and habits as a underlying 
determinant of behavior (e.g., an impulse or S-R association). 
To reduce confusion, in this paper, I will use the term “habitual 
behavior” to refer to habits as a type of behavior. Importantly, 
all definitions of habits put forward criteria for distinguishing 
between habitual and non-habitual behavior. These criteria can 
1 Note that the concept of stimulus-driven behavior does not overlap with the 
concept of respondent behavior that is often used by functional researchers 
(see Skinner, 1953). Like stimulus-driven behavior, respondent behavior is under 
the control of stimuli in the environment. However, unlike stimulus-driven 
behavior, behavior can be  called respondent only if it was never before under 
the control of its consequences. This is an important distinction because it is 
typically assumed that many stimulus-driven behaviors are originally goal-directed 
but become stimulus-driven only as the result of the frequent execution of 
the behavior. Hence, most stimulus-driven behaviors do not qualify as respondent 
behavior. The distinction between respondent and stimulus-driven behavior is 
related to the fact that functional psychology focuses on functional causation 
(A is a function of B) whereas cognitive psychology focuses on mechanistic 
causation (A triggers B; see Chiesa, 1992, for an excellent discussion). Functional 
causation does not require contiguous causes (i.e., events in the here and now 
that put behavior in motion, much like one cogwheel can put another cogwheel 
in motion) but allows for causes that are present in the past. Hence, if the 
presence of a behavior in the past has been a function of its consequences 
(i.e., it was an operant behavior) and if its current presence is a function of 
its presence in the past (i.e., it is more likely now because it was repeatedly 
emitted in the past), then the current presence of the behavior is a function 
of the consequences of the behavior in the past, which is why also the current 
behavior would qualify as an operant behavior. The concept of stimulus-driven 
behavior, on the other hand, only takes into account contiguous causes and 
thus only entities that are present immediately before the behavior is initiated. 
For cognitive psychologists, these contiguous causes can be events in the current 
physical environment but also representations at the mental level. A behavior 
qualifies as stimulus-driven if the only contiguous cause of the behavior is 
(the representation of) a stimulus in the environment without the involvement 
of representations of goals. In sum, whereas the concept of respondent behavior 
is inherently functional in nature, the concept of stimulus-driven behavior is 
inherently mental in that it refers to the (absence of a) mechanistic causal 
impact of goal representations (see De Houwer, 2011; Hughes et  al., 2016, for 
a discussion of the relation between functional and cognitive psychology). 
Within functional psychology, one could in principle study how the frequency 
of reinforcement in the past changes the moderators of behavior in the present 
(e.g., Barnes-Holmes et  al., 2017).
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refer to more or less observable characteristics of behavior 
(e.g., frequency, persistence, automaticity); to assumptions about 
the experiences that cause this behavior (e.g., repetition of a 
behavior in a context); and/or to assumptions about the mental 
processes and representations that cause the behavior (e.g., 
the activation of an impulse via the operation of an 
S-R association).
In this paper, I  focus on the implications of the criteria 
that habit researchers use to distinguish habitual from 
non-habitual behavior. Although Gardner (2015) correctly points 
out that scientists should move beyond mere description of 
behavior and consider the causes of behavior, there are downsides 
to incorporating causal elements within scientific definitions 
of to-be-explained phenomena. First, it can hamper attempts 
to verify empirically whether the phenomenon is present (i.e., 
to determine whether a behavior qualifies as habitual), which 
leads to difficulties in studying the phenomenon. Causality 
can never be  observed directly but must always be  inferred 
from observable events. This problem is exacerbated when the 
causes themselves are unobservable, as is the case with many 
mental processes and representations (e.g., S-R associations in 
memory). Second, defining phenomena in terms of their causes 
confounds the explanandum (that which needs to be explained) 
with the explanans (that by which the explanandum is explained; 
Hempel, 1970). In other words, it implies a priori assumptions 
about the causes of the phenomenon. This is less problematic 
when those a priori assumptions turn out to be  justified. 
However, if those assumptions are incorrect, then research 
based on this definition does not necessarily inform us about 
the phenomenon, thus hampering the cumulative nature of 
research. Moreover, an a priori commitment to certain causes 
of a phenomenon may prevent researchers from considering 
the role of other potential causes of the phenomenon, thereby 
reducing theoretical diversity and ultimately hampering 
theoretical progress.
In the remainder of this paper, I  discuss these challenges 
at the empirical and theoretical level, as well as possible ways 
to deal with those challenges. Rather than providing a systematic 
review of the literature in order to assess the exact extent to 
which problems at the empirical and theoretical level arise in 
habit research, I  will focus on developing the conceptual 
argument and will merely provide examples of the problems 
that can arise. The examples that I provide come from behavioral 
research on habits in humans. The conceptual issues that 
I  address also apply to neuroscientific research on habits in 
humans but this research will not be  covered in this paper.
THE EMPIRICAL LEVEL: ESTABLISHING 
THE PRESENCE OF HABITUAL 
BEHAVIOR
For many psychologists, the defining characteristic of habits 
is that they are stimulus-driven (Gardner, 2015; Wood and 
Rünger, 2016). This idea introduces several causal assumptions 
within the definition of habitual behavior. In the following 
paragraphs, I  will highlight these causal assumptions, as well 
as the challenges they create for establishing that behavior is 
habitual in the sense of stimulus-driven.
On the one hand, the concept of stimulus-driven behavior 
implies that habitual behavior is caused directly by stimuli in 
the environment. Although the causal impact of stimuli on 
behavior cannot be  observed directly, it is relatively easy to 
infer the environmental causes of behavior by manipulating 
the presence of stimuli and examining how this influences the 
presence of the behavior. If the behavior is present when a 
certain stimulus is present in the environment but absent when 
that stimulus is absent, this provides strong grounds for arguing 
that the stimulus is causally related to the occurrence of 
the behavior.
On the other hand, in the context of habit research, “stimulus-
driven” not only implies that a stimulus is causally related to 
the behavior but also that the behavior is not a function of 
its anticipated consequences. Put differently, stimulus-driven 
behavior is not directed at goals (Adams, 1982; Heyes and 
Dickinson, 1990; see Moors et  al., 2017, for a detailed analysis 
of what it means to say that behavior is goal-directed). Hence, 
establishing that a behavior is habitual requires arguments for 
the conclusion that the behavior is not directed at goals2. There 
are, however, several reasons why it is not easy to convincingly 
demonstrate that behavior is not directed at goals. First, goal 
representations are mental entities that cannot be  observed 
directly by researchers (and, in the case of unconscious goals, 
also not by the person who possesses the goal). Second, whether 
these entities have a causal impact can also not be  observed 
directly because causality always needs to be  inferred from 
observations. Third, verifying the absence of causal impact of 
mental entities is even more difficult to achieve than verifying 
the presence of these entities and their causal impact on behavior.
Habit researchers have tried to circumvent the first two 
problems by using behavioral proxies of the causal impact of 
goal representations on behavior. They reasoned that if a goal 
causally mediates a behavior, then changing the goal or its 
relation to the behavior should also change the behavior. For 
instance, in order to establish that lever pressing is mediated 
by the goal to eat a specific food, one could reduce the goal 
to eat that food by making it aversive (i.e., devaluation test) 
or by no longer delivering the food after a lever press (i.e., 
contingency degradation test). From a cognitive point of view, 
it is indeed relatively safe to conclude that the behavior is 
mediated by a particular goal representation if those interventions 
change behavior (e.g., Adams, 1982; Heyes and Dickinson, 1990).
Whereas this strategy might circumvent the first two problems 
that were noted above, it does not solve the third problem. 
2 If one interprets “stimulus-driven” in a strict manner as indicating that the 
behavior is a function solely of the stimulus, then demonstrating the stimulus-
driven nature of behavior would also require evidence that the behavior does 
not depend on any enabling conditions, such as the availability of sufficient 
attentional resources (Bargh, 1989). In this paper, however, I  focus only on 
the assumption that goals are not causally involved in stimulus-driven behavior.
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More specifically, behavior may be  mediated by goals even if 
an effect of devaluation and contingency degradation is not 
found (Heyes and Dickinson, 1990; Thrailkill and Bouton, 2015; 
Moors et  al., 2017). It is indeed possible that the intervention 
was not strong enough (e.g., it did not fully eliminate the 
palatability of the food), that statistical power was insufficient 
for establishing the presence of goals and their impact on 
behavior (see Vadillo et  al., 2019), or that the intervention 
targeted another goal than the one that actually mediates 
behavior (De Houwer et  al., 2018).
With regard to the latter point, De Houwer et  al. (2018) 
examined one of the most widely used paradigms in research 
on habits in humans, namely the fabulous fruit game (e.g., 
de Wit et  al., 2007). Without going into detail, in this task, 
participants repeatedly press keys in order to generate images 
of fruits, some of which are worth points. During an outcome 
devaluation phase, the value of some of the fruits is reduced 
(i.e., they are no longer worth points). Habits are typically 
inferred from the lack of impact of fruit-devaluation on key 
presses. However, the data reported by De Houwer et al. support 
the idea that these seemingly habitual key presses are still 
directed at the goal of obtaining points. For instance, changing 
the value of points did influence responding even when changing 
the value of fruits did not.
As another example, consider the well-known study of Neal 
et  al. (2011). These authors observed that people who often 
eat popcorn when watching a movie in a cinema theater 
(“habit” group) will continue to eat popcorn even when it is 
stale (i.e., devalued) whereas people who do not often eat 
popcorn in cinemas (“nonhabit” group) stop eating stale 
popcorn. Although this suggests that eating popcorn in the 
“habit” group is not mediated by the goal to have tasty food 
whereas that goal does mediate popcorn eating in the “nonhabit” 
group, it does not necessarily imply that popcorn eating in 
the “habit” group was stimulus-driven. For instance, it is 
possible that eating popcorn in the “habit” group was mediated 
by the goal to have a more complete cinematic experience. 
Let us assume that for people who often eat popcorn in a 
cinema theater, the cinematic experience is not complete 
without eating popcorn whereas for controls, the richness of 
the cinematic experience does not depend on eating popcorn. 
If this assumption is correct, then eating stale popcorn will 
be  goal-conductive for members of the “habit” group but not 
for controls. In other words, people in the “habit” group might 
be  more willing to tolerate the bad taste of the stale popcorn 
because for them, eating popcorn while watching a movie 
has merit as such, even when it does not taste good. Of 
course, it remains to be seen whether these auxiliary assumptions 
about the differences in the goal-conduciveness of eating 
popcorn in the “habit” and “nonhabit” group are valid. If 
additional studies do not provide support for the alternative 
goal-directed account, one should be  willing to accept the 
conclusion that the behavior is habitual rather than adhere 
to the irrefutable claim that the behavior must be  mediated 
by some type of goal. Nevertheless, researchers should consider 
the possibility that devaluation and contingency degradation 
tests lack sensitivity or fail to target the goal that is actually 
driving behavior (De Houwer et  al., 2018)3.
These problems cannot be sidestepped by inferring the lack 
of goal-directedness from the automatic nature of behavior. 
Because stimulus-driven behavior is assumed to be  automatic, 
one might see evidence for automaticity as an indication of 
the fact that behavior is stimulus-driven. However, it is now 
generally accepted that automatic behavior is not necessarily 
stimulus-driven (e.g., Bargh, 1989, 1990; Aarts and Dijksterhuis, 
2000; for a recent discussion, see Huang and Bargh, 2014). 
Even addictive behaviors, which are often seen as prototypical 
examples of automatic behavior because they are emitted 
despite their obvious negative consequences, are now considered 
by some to be  directed at realizing goals (e.g., Baumeister, 
2017; Hogarth, 2018; Kopetz et  al., 2018). Moreover, if one 
would decide to infer the stimulus-driven nature of behavior 
from its automaticity, there remains the problem of establishing 
whether behavior qualifies as automatic. Just like there are 
many definitions of the concept “habit,” there are many 
definitions of the concept “automatic.” Most of these definitions 
refer to one or more automaticity feature, such as unintentional, 
involuntary, fast, efficient, or unconscious (Bargh, 1989, 1994; 
Moors and De Houwer, 2006). Because different automaticity 
features do not necessarily co-occur, establishing automaticity 
thus requires one to specify the automaticity features one has 
in mind and to test the presence of each feature individually. 
This opens up debates about which features are crucial for 
determining whether a behavior is automatic and whether 
the term “automaticity” is still useful as a unifying concept 
(Fiedler and Hütter, 2014). Moreover, Moors (2016) convincingly 
argued that the extent to which a type of behavior or process 
displays a certain feature of automaticity (e.g., the extent to 
which semantic processing depends on conscious input) can 
vary across contexts. Hence, there is little merit in saying 
that a process or behavior has a certain feature of automaticity 
in an absolute sense (e.g., that semantic processing is an 
unconscious process)4. For all these reasons, there is little 
3 Note that this problem in part arises because in this and many other studies 
with humans, researchers did not have full experimental control over the 
outcomes that at which behavior is directed. Instead, researchers often look 
at behaviors that were acquired before participants took part in the study (e.g., 
popcorn eating in cinema visitors). In most animal studies, on the other hand, 
the potentially habitual behavior has been established experimentally by linking 
it with a particular outcome (e.g., food). In these cases, there is more certainty 
about the outcome that is actually controlling the behavior during its initial 
stages. Hence, it is unlikely that the behavior is controlled by a different outcome 
when devaluation or contingency degradation tests suggest that it is no longer 
controlled by the original outcome of the behavior. Nevertheless, even in fully 
experimental research, one should take care that statistical power is sufficient 
to establish the absence of an effect (Vadillo et al., 2019) and that the devaluation 
and contingency degradation tests are sensitive enough.
4 One could argue that the time needed to initiate or complete a behavior is 
related to whether the behavior can be considered a skill rather than to whether 
a behavior is considered to be  a habit. Nevertheless, speed of performance 
has explicitly been put forward by some as a characteristic of habitual behavior, 
next to other automaticity features (e.g., Wood and Rünger, 2016, p.  292). 
Because of the difficulty in distinguishing conceptually and empirically between 
skills and habits, I  will sidestep this issue in the current paper.
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merit in establishing the stimulus-driven nature of behavior 
on the basis of its automaticity.
Many definitions of habits do not only incorporate the assumption 
that habits are stimulus-driven but also assumptions about the 
factors that are responsible for the stimulus-driven nature of habits 
(see Gardner, 2015). First, it is often assumed that behavior 
becomes stimulus-driven if it has been frequently emitted in the 
context of a certain stimulus. Second, many researchers assume 
that stimulus-driven behavior is instigated via the activation of 
S-R associations that have been formed gradually as the result 
of the frequent co-occurrence of a stimulus and a behavior. 
Although both proposals certainly have merits, from the current 
perspective, they add additional causal elements to the definition 
of habits and habitual behavior which result in additional difficulties 
in establishing whether behavior qualifies as habitual.
Let us first consider frequency as a cause of stimulus-driven 
behavior. Many researchers assume that behavior should become 
more habit-like (i.e., stimulus-driven) the more frequently it 
is emitted in a certain context, that is, the more it is overtrained 
(e.g., de Wit et  al., 2018). The causal role of frequency can 
be  examined by manipulating the frequency of a behavior and 
observing indices of the stimulus-driven nature of the behavior. 
Note, however, that experimental designs allow for causal 
conclusions only if confounding variables are controlled for. 
For instance, the frequency of behavior (i.e., how often it 
occurs) can be  confounded with the recency of behavior (i.e., 
the time elapsed between the test phase and the most recent 
occurrence of a behavior). Assuming that the impact of past 
events decreases with time and/or the number of intervening 
events (Ebbinghaus, 1913), it is possible that differences at 
test between frequent and infrequent behavior reflect recency 
rather than frequency or a combination of both. A confound 
between frequency and recency is typically avoided by varying 
frequency while keeping recency constant across conditions 
(e.g., de Wit et  al., 2018). Another approach which has been 
implemented less frequently in the literature on habits is to 
manipulate frequency and recency orthogonally so that the 
relative contribution of and interaction between both factors 
can be  examined (e.g., Schmidt et  al., 2019, submitted).
Researchers often also refer to S-R associations as the mental 
cause of stimulus-driven behavior. More specifically, they assume 
that a stimulus can initiate a behavior by activating its 
representation in memory, activation which can then spread 
via the S-R association to the response representation and 
thereby bring about the response without the involvement of 
the representations of goals. Traditionally, S-R associations are 
assumed to form gradually as the result of the frequent 
co-occurrence of a stimulus and a behavior, as well as the 
presence of rewards that follow the behavior when it is emitted 
in the presence of the stimulus (e.g., de Wit et  al., 2007; 
Wood and Rünger, 2016). Establishing that stimulus-driven 
behavior is mediated by S-R associations is faced with the 
same problems as establishing stimulus-driven behavior (see 
above) but also with the additional problem of demonstrating 
the mediating role of S-R associations. The fact that neither 
S-R associations themselves nor their causal impact can 
be observed directly complicates efforts to verify the involvement 
of S-R associations in behavior. Procedures have been developed 
to assess the strength of S-R associations indirectly (e.g., via 
their impact on lexical decision times; e.g., Neal et  al., 2012) 
but the usefulness of these procedures depends on how valid 
they are (see De Houwer, 2011).
One could argue that stimulus-driven behavior is by definition 
mediated by S-R associations and that evidence for the stimulus-
driven nature of behavior thus constitutes evidence for the 
mediating role of S-R associations. However, in that case, it 
is not clear what the idea of S-R associations adds to the 
notion of stimulus-driven behavior. Such added value can come 
only from specific theoretical ideas about what those S-R 
associations are (e.g., abstractive links between mental 
representations of stimuli and responses), how they are formed 
(e.g., gradually as the result of repetition or rewards), and 
how they influence behavior (e.g., via the automatic spreading 
of activation from the stimulus to the associated response 
representation; e.g., de Wit et  al., 2007). Hence, incorporating 
the notion of S-R associations into the definition of habits 
comes with specific theoretical commitments, which requires 
the specification of additional criteria to distinguish “real” 
habitual behavior (i.e., stimulus-driven behavior that is mediated 
by a specific type of S-R associations that develops under 
specific conditions) from other stimulus-driven behavior (i.e., 
behavior that is stimulus-driven but mediated by another type 
of representation). In sum, defining habits in terms of S-R 
associations only aggravates the problem of empirically verifying 
whether behavior is “truly” habitual.
THE THEORETICAL LEVEL: EXPLAINING 
HABITUAL BEHAVIOR
Introducing causal elements within the definition of habits and 
habitual behavior not only results in challenges at the empirical 
level (i.e., the possibility of verifying that behavior is habitual) 
but can also limit theoretical innovation. In this section, I focus 
primarily on definitions of habits that refer to S-R associations. 
After discussing their dominance, I  sketch two alternative 
theories of habitual (in the sense of stimulus-driven) behavior. 
In that way, I  hope to clarify that it is not only possible to 
consider other models when trying to explain habitual behavior 
but also that it can be  beneficial to do so. Considering these 
other models is, however, only possible if one removes the 
notion of S-R associations from the definition of habits.
The current theoretical literature on habits is dominated by 
S-R association formation models. Even researchers who do 
not explicitly define habits in terms S-R associations often 
consider only S-R associations when trying to explain habitual 
behavior (e.g., Wood and Rünger, 2016). This dominance of 
S-R association models in the literature on habits is probably 
based on the fact that these models are compatible with the 
widespread definition of habitual behavior as behavior that is 
automatic and stimulus-driven as the result of frequent stimulus–
response co-occurrences. Behavior that is driven by S-R 
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associations (1) must have been emitted frequently enough to 
allow for the gradual formation of an S-R association, (2) has 
features of automaticity because activation can spread across 
associations automatically, and (3) is stimulus-driven in that 
the activation of S-R associations is instigated only by a stimulus 
and does not involve goal representations. In fact, the match 
between the mechanism of activating gradually acquired S-R 
associations and the phenomenon of habitual (i.e., frequency-
induced automatic stimulus-driven) behavior is so good that 
one might wonder whether any other mechanism could account 
for behavior that is stimulus-driven and automatic. In this 
section, I briefly discuss two of these alternatives just to illustrate 
that (1) other mechanisms are possible and (2) there is merit 
in at least allowing for theoretical diversity.
First, Logan (1988) pointed out that behavior could 
be  mediated by the similarity-based automatic retrieval of 
episodic representations from memory. Episodic memory traces 
differ from S-R associations as they are typically conceived 
of as being non-abstractive: whereas different experiences all 
contribute to the strength of a single association, episodic 
memory models assume that each individual experience is 
stored as a separate memory trace (e.g., Medin and Schaffer, 
1978). Moreover, whereas simple associations do not specify 
the way in which events are related (e.g., whether A causes, 
predicts, or merely co-occurs with B; see Lagnado et al., 2007), 
episodic memory traces encode the way in which an event 
is constructed by an individual, including assumptions that 
are made about the relation between events. According to 
episodic models, stimuli in the current environment 
automatically activate episodic memory traces that contain 
information about similar stimuli. If those activated memory 
traces also contain information about a particular response, 
then this can lead to the automatic execution of that response. 
The likelihood that responses are automatically activated depends 
on the number of episodes that encompass both the stimulus 
and the response, as well as time that has elapsed since the 
episode was constructed. Hence, episodic models differ in 
important ways from S-R association formation models as 
they are typically conceived of (i.e., concrete vs. abstract; 
relational vs. associative; similarity-based retrieval vs. spreading 
of activation). Nevertheless, according to episodic models, a 
stimulus in the current environment can result in behavior 
that (1) has frequently been emitted in the context of that 
stimulus, (2) has features of automaticity, and (3) is merely 
stimulus-driven5. As such, episodic memory models such as 
5 Note, however, that episodes can also contain information about the goals 
that someone has when performing an action. Hence, automatic retrieval 
of episodes (and thus automatically activated behavior) could also depend 
on goals at the time of retrieval (Logan, 1988). In those cases, the behavior 
at the time of retrieval would not qualify as stimulus-driven. It would 
be  interesting to run simulations to see whether there are circumstances in 
which goals at retrieval do not influence the automatic retrieval of episodes 
(e.g., when stimulus–response relations remain constant while goals vary). 
Such simulations could provide new insights into whether and when behavior 
is stimulus-driven.
those proposed by Logan (1988) provide an interesting alternative 
for S-R association formation models of habitual behavior.
Considering also episodic models of habitual behavior will 
increase theoretical diversity within the literature on habits, 
which is bound to enrich theoretical discussions and empirical 
research. For instance, unlike typical S-R association formation 
models, episodic memory models assign an important role 
to the recency of events and can thus inspire research that 
examines the relative contribution of frequency and recency 
in habitual behavior (see Schmidt et  al., 2019, submitted, for 
an example). Moreover, because episodes can encode also 
instructions, episodic models might provide a new perspective 
on the finding that automatic behavior can result from simple 
instructions and implementation intentions (e.g., Martiny-
Huenger et  al., 2017; Meiran et  al., 2017). Finally, because 
episodic models assign an important role to factors at retrieval, 
they can also inspire research on the context dependency of 
habitual behavior. With regard to the latter point, it remains 
to be seen whether the emphasis on retrieval factors in episodic 
models fits with what is known about the functioning of 
habit memory.
Second, habit researchers have recently benefited from another 
alternative for the traditional S-R association formation model, 
namely predictive coding models. These models have been 
highly influential in neurocognitive research on a variety of 
topics such as perception, memory, and attention (e.g., Friston, 
2010, 2018; Clark, 2013). The core assumption is that organisms 
constantly build a mental model of the world which allows 
them to behave in ways that minimize energy expenditure. 
Both model construction and behavior selection are assumed 
to be  based on inferential processes that can operate under 
conditions of automaticity. As such, predictive coding models 
provide a natural account of automatic behavior (Van Dessel 
et  al., 2019). Stimulus-driven behavior, on the other hand, 
could be  conceptualized as behavior that is guided by simple 
(i.e., hierarchically shallow) models that do not include 
information about higher order goals of the organism (see 
FitzGerald et  al., 2014; Friston et  al., 2016, for more details). 
Although predictive coding theories are not incompatible with 
the idea of gradually acquired S-R associations, they do provide 
a new perspective on how those S-R associations are formed 
and influence behavior. Moreover, considering predictive coding 
models could offer highly formalized theories of habits that 
allow for new predictions, for instance, with regard to what 
happens when habitual behavior does not lead to predicted 
outcomes (FitzGerald et  al., 2014).
Note that considering alternative theories about habitual 
behavior does not change the fact that it is advisable to ban 
assumptions of specific mental representations and processes 
from the definition of habits. Regardless of the nature of the 
mental representations or processes that are assumed to be crucial 
for habits (S-R associations, episodes, predictive coding), it 
will always be  difficult to verify empirically the involvement 
of a specific type of mental representation of process. 
Acknowledging multiple mental process explanations of habitual 
(in the sense of stimulus-driven) behavior also does not solve 
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the problem that it is difficult to demonstrate with certainty 
that behavior is not directed at (hidden) goals. However, 
considering multiple theories about the mental representations 
and processes that mediate habitual behavior does enrich the 
theoretical debate and can thus lead to new discoveries.
FINAL THOUGHTS ON OVERCOMING 
THE CHALLENGES OF HABIT 
RESEARCH
Habit research is faced with many challenges (see de Wit et al., 
2018; Watson and de Wit, 2018, for a discussion). The central 
message of this paper is that many of these challenges result 
from the inclusion of causal elements within the definition of 
habits. This not only makes it difficult to establish and thus 
study habits and habitual behavior (see section “The Empirical 
Level: Establishing the Presence of Habitual Behavior”) but 
can also constrain thinking about the mechanisms mediating 
habitual behavior (see section “The Theoretical Level: Explaining 
Habitual Behavior”). Hence, from this perspective, a possible 
solution for the challenges of habit research is to reduce the 
number of causal elements from the definition of habits and 
habitual behavior.
Based on the arguments presented above, it can be  strongly 
recommended to remove any assumptions about S-R associations 
from the definition of habits and habitual behavior. Such 
assumptions aggravate the problems of empirically verifying the 
presence of habitual behavior and entail the risk of impoverishing 
theoretical debate by (implicitly or explicitly) committing 
researchers to a priori assumptions about the nature of the 
representations and processes that mediate stimulus-driven 
behavior. Theories about S-R associations can still be an important 
part of habit research but rather than being a part of the 
explanandum (i.e., that which needs to be  explained) the role 
of these theories would be  firmly restricted to that of one 
possible explanans (i.e., that which explains; Hempel, 1970).
What about the widespread idea that habits are stimulus-
driven? As noted above, this idea introduces a number of causal 
elements within the definition of habits, not only about what 
is a cause of behavior (i.e., the stimulus) but also about what 
is not a cause of behavior (i.e., goals). Especially the latter 
element hampers the capacity to determine whether a behavior 
qualifies as habitual. However, as Gardner (2015) correctly pointed 
out, scientists are engaged with the causes of behavior rather 
than with simply describing behavior. As far as psychological 
explanations go, the distinction between explanations that do 
and do not involve goals is a fundamental one, not least because 
it has important implications for how to influence behavior 
(i.e., manipulating goals will only affect behavior that is mediated 
by those goals; De Houwer, 2019). Hence, it is understandable 
that cognitive scientists are interested in studying stimulus-driven 
behavior, that is, behavior that is not mediated by goals.
Nevertheless, researchers who wish to study habits in the 
sense of stimulus-driven behavior are well advised to proceed 
cautiously. The stimulus-driven nature of behavior cannot be 
observed directly, nor are there perfect proxies for establishing 
stimulus-driven behavior. As noted about, devaluation and 
contingency degradation test are strong indicators of the 
involvement of goals but not of the non-involvement of goals. 
Establishing the automaticity of behavior is not only difficult 
but also does not guarantee that the behavior is stimulus-
driven. Although these difficulties should not stop researchers 
from examining stimulus-driven behavior, they need to 
be aware of these problems and take them into account when 
drawing conclusions.
Another option is to ban any reference to the stimulus-
driven nature of habits from the definition of habits, which 
would leave only the notion that habits result from the frequent 
performance of a behavior in a certain context, as well as the 
notion that habits are automatic (Gardner, 2015). Choosing 
this option would imply that behavior is regarded as habitual 
if it can be  established that (1) its presence is due to its past 
frequency and/or (2) it has features of automaticity. As noted 
above, both criteria are also not without problems. Establishing 
the role of frequency requires well-controlled experimental 
studies. Establishing the automaticity of behavior can entail 
many different, non-overlapping, and context-dependent 
automaticity features, some of which are difficult to verify 
because they refer to mental processes (Moors, 2016). Moreover, 
focusing exclusively on frequency would eliminate recency as 
a possible cause of habitual behavior. Hence, researchers who 
wish to define habit research as the study of frequent or 
automatic behavior should also be  aware of the challenges 
entailed by this view on habits.
A possible way to reduce these challenges is to focus 
on features of automatic behavior that are relatively easy 
to verify. For instance, habit researchers could study behavior 
that is instigated quickly in certain contexts or that people 
subjectively experience as having little conscious control 
over. These criteria can be  verified using experimental tasks 
or questionnaires. Once consensus over these criteria has 
been reached, researchers could document the moderators 
of those behaviors (i.e., the conditions under which behaviors 
with those automaticity features occur), which constrains 
theories about the mental mechanisms that produce those 
behavior. Such an approach would imply a clear separation 
between the explanandum of habit research (i.e., specific 
instances of automatic behavior) and the explanans of habit 
research (i.e., assumptions about the causal mechanisms that 
produce automatic behavior). It would also bring academic 
habit research closer to the notion that lay people have 
about habits.
Different researchers will probably choose different paths 
to overcome the challenges of habit research. Those whose 
primary interest lies in studying whether and when behavior 
is stimulus-driven (i.e., not mediated by goal representations) 
will probably continue to define habitual behavior as stimulus-
driven behavior but, hopefully, ban any reference to specific 
S-R theories from their definitions, as well as use proxies of 
stimulus-driven behavior in a cautious manner. Those who 
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wish to understand why behavior can be  initiated quickly and 
why people sometimes report to have little control over their 
behavior will be  probably be  happy with defining habits as 
automatic behavior. The aim of this paper is not to convince 
researchers to ban all causal elements from the definition of 
habits (or other concepts in psychology), nor to promote a 
particular definition of habits. Instead, the main aim is to 
highlight that choosing a definition of habits has important 
implications for both empirical research (i.e., how to establish 
whether behavior is habitual) as well as theory development 
(i.e., proposals about the mechanisms that underlie habitual 
behavior). Hence, it is important to make explicit the causal 
assumptions that researchers make when using a particular 
definition of habits, as well as to acknowledge the challenges 
that these assumptions imply.
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